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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
HAROLD FULLER,
Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 7640

FAVORITE THEATERS OF SALT
LAKE CITY, a Corporation,
Respondent

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

STATE~IENT

OF FACTS

This is an action for damages for breach of a contract
made between "Masterpiece Productions," a New York corporation, and "Favorite Theaters of Salt Lake City," a corporation of the state of Washington.
Masterpiece Productions agreed to supply a schedule of
films to Favorite Theaters to be delivered within a specified
period and Favorite agreed to schedule and play said films.
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Favorite thereafter notified Masterpiece that it refused to
go on with the contract. Masterpiece, after attempting to
obtain performance from Favorite without success, assigned
all rights of action for damages arising out of said agreement
to Harold Fuller, the plaintiff-appellant.
• Fuller sued for breach of contract and Favorite defended
that the contract was not assignable and therefore any assignment of a right to money damages was void. The trial court
ordered a pre-trial to decide whether the clause was a bar to
such an assignment and held that it was.
From the pre-trial order dismissing the complaint and
from the judgment rendered thereon of "no cause of action"
the plaintiff appeals.
The only issue before the court on this appeal is whether
a clause prohibiting the assignment of the contract also prevents the assignment, after breach, of rights of action arising
out of the breach.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
A CLAUSE FORBIDDING THE ASSIGN!viENT OF
THE CONTRACT BY ONE PARTY "WITHOUT THE
~7RITTEN CONSENT OF THE OTHER," DOES NOT
PRECLUDE AN ASSIGNMENT OF A RIGHT OF ACTION
ARISING OUT OF A BREACH OF SAID CONTRACT.
The defendant, at the pre-trial, moved that the plaintiffs
complaint be dismissed on the ground that, since the contract
4
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was not assignable, any attempt to assign a right of action
arising out of a breach of this contract was not effective and
the plaintiff-assignee could consequently have no standing in
court.
It is submitted that the court below failed to see the very
important distinction between an assignment of the contract
and an assignment of a right to damages arising out of the
defendant's breach of the contract.
Every case cited by counsel for the defendant in his brief
to the Court below stood only for the following propositions:
a. A contract may be so personal in its nature that it
cannot be assigned.
b. The parties may provide against assignment of a
contract.
None of these cases were in point. In the case before this court
the contract had been breached and performance was no longer
possible. All that remained was a duty upon_ the defendant
to pay the liquidated damages agreed to in the contract. Such
a right to damages is universally held to be assignable even
though the contract was not.
The clause upon which the respondent relies reads as
follows:
"ASSIGN1v1ENT UPON SALE OF THEATERSIXTH: This license shall not be assigned by either
party without the written consent of the other, and
the sale or transfer by the Exhibitor of all or any part
of his interest in the theatre specified herein shall not
relieve him of his obligations hereunder without the
'I)
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written consent of the Distributor at its home office
in New York City first had and obtained."
The court below in granting the defendant's motion to
dismiss, in effect held that as a matter of law such a clause
prevented any assignment of rights of action resulting from
a breach of the contract. It is respectfully submitted that the
language of the clause clearly shows that the only intent of
the parties was to prohibit the assignment of performance of
their respective duties under the contract. Such clauses are
standard dauses in contracts where the parties desire to
bargain for the performance of each other, but once the contract is breached and performance can no longer. be had, it
does not bar an assignment of any rights of action accruing
as a result of the breach. In this case the parties desired the
performance of each other but when the defendant-respondent
refused to take the films as agreed, performance by the assignor of the plaintiff-appellant was no longer possible, and
the plaintiffs assignor had a right to the payment of money
damages which right could be assigned.
In the case of Sackman t'. Stephenson, 11 N. Y. S. 2d 69,
the court was presented with an identical problem and it correctly distinguished between an assignment of the contract and
an assignment of a right of action arising out of a breach of
the contract. In that case a correspondence school agreed to
teach, counsel, and supply materials for study to the defendant
in consideration for the defendant's promise to pay for the
service in monthly instalfments. The defendant failed to
pay as promised. The school then assigned the contract for
collection to Sackman. The defendant set up as a defense
6
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(just as Favorite Theaters has done in our case) that the contract was not assignable and thus the plaintiff-assignee had
no standing to sue for the breach of the contract. The trial
court so held.
The Supreme court in reversing the trial court correctly
observed:
"The contract at bar is a contract of a personal
nature involving the relation of personal confidence,
individual instruction under the supervision of a teaching staff and practical experience in the Institutes training laboratory.
The rule, however, applies to an executed cont-ract.
Here the defendant breached the contract. The monthly
installments all fell due before the action was started.
The plaintiff's assignor, however, did not assign an
executed contract, but a right to recover damages based
on a contract which the defendant breached. A chose
in action may be assigned which was all that wetS done
in this case. There is no defense to the action."
The rule is clearly stated by Professor Williston tn his
famous treatise on contracts:
"A contract which was too personal for assignment
may, on its breach, give rise to an assignable action for
damages." Williston on Contracts Rev. Ed., Sec. 412 at
p. 1190.
Again this fundamental distinction is observed by the
editors of Curptts Juris Secundum "Assignments No. 31":
"A right of action for damages for a breach ?f co~
tract may be assigned, even though the contrctct ttself iJ'
not assignable."
7
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In Marsh v. Perkins, 230 N. Y~ S. 406, the court was concerned with this very problem and correctly restated the rule.
The plaintiffs conceded in that case that the contract itself was
not assignable but contended (as the plaintiff-appellant did in
the case before this court) that the cause of action arising out
of the broken contract was assignable. The court in holding
the assignment valid said:
"The sole point raised by the defendant on its motion to dismiss the complaint is that the rights of
the defenndant under the contract of September 21,
1925, are not assignable and that the plaintiffs, as
his assignees, are therefore without standing to maintain this action.''
"It is their contention that they are relying not upon
an assignment of the agreement proper, but rather
upon the transfer to them, AFTER BREACH, of such
causes of action as Tench may have possessed ...
by reason of their failure to comply with the contract."
After stating this issue, which is the exact issue that is
before the court in the instant case, the court quotes "Williston"
as cited in this brief supra and held:
"In Williston on Contracts, the author points out
that AFTER BREACH« cause of action based thereon
may be assigned, although the contract itself was
theretofot'e non-assignable. The motion is accordingly
denied."
This court correctly distinguished between the contract and
a cause of action arising as a result of a breach of a contract.
There is good reason to limit the performance of a personal
contract to performance by th_e parties to it. There is no reason
8
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to limit one in whose favor a cause of action has arisen from
assigning his right to money damages after a breach of the
contract.
In Trubou·itch z·. Rizoerbank Canning Co., 182 P. 2nd 182,
the court went further and allowed an assignee of a contract
which was made specifically not assignable to enforce a term
of the contract. In that case A and D had a contract involving
the sale of a shipment of tomato paste. The contract contained
a provision that in the event of breach, the parties would submit the controversy to an arbitration board to determine the
equities and assess the damages and costs. The contract contained the following clause:
"This contract is not assignable and goods sold hereunder are not to be shipped or diverted to any destination other than that herein specified, without consent
of the seller."
P, assignee of the contract, sued to enforce the arbitration
clause and have damages assessed for the breach. D plead
in answer to the plaintiffs complaint "that defendant never
at any time consented to any assignment of said contract''
p. 185. (The same defense was set up by Favorite Theaters
in this case). The case was submitted to the court on briefs
just as it was in the case now on appeal before this honorable
court. The trial court held, just as the trial court did in the
case before this court, that plaintiff had no standing to compel
defendant to arbitrate the controversy and dismissed plaintiff's
complaint.
The plaintiff on appeal from this judgment contended that
the assignment of a right to have money damages assessed was
9
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assignable even though the contract clause prohibited the
assignment of the contract. The court said:
"It is established that a provision in a contract or ·
a rule of law against assignment does not preclude the
assignment of money due or to become due under the
contract (Butler v. San Francisco Gas & Electric Co.,
168 Cal. 32, 41, 141 P. 818; Taylor v. Black Diamond
Coal Min. Co., 86 Cal. 589, 590, 25 P. 51; Dixon-Reo
Co. v. Horton Motor Co., 49 N.D. 304, 191 N.W.
780; see 76 S.L.R. 1307; 2 Williston on Contracts Rev.
Ed. # 422) or of money damages for the breach of the
contract." (Citing long line of cases so holding together with 2 Williston, Contracts Rev. Ed. Sec. 412,
p. 1180; 4 Am. Jur. 237, 239, 240; 6 C.J.S. Assignments #31, p. 1080.) p. 185."
It might be of interest to the court to note, that even in
the cases where the contract specifically provides that any claims
arising under the contract cannot be assigned, the courts hold
that such a clause does not prevent an assignment of a right
of action:
"A provision in a policy against assignment does not
apply to assignment after loss, and a specific prot1ision
against such an assignment is null and void, as inconsistent with the covenant of indemnity and CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY." Southwest Bell Telephone Co. t!. Ocean Accident Corp., 22 F. Supp. 686.

SUMl\1ARY
The trial court erred in holding that paragraph six in
the contract prevents a valid assignment, after breach, of a right
10
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to l

M

to liquidated damages arising as a result of the respondent's
failure to perform the contract.
The clause does not, by any possible construction prevent
an assignment of this chose in action. The intention of the
parties was clearly to prevent the assignment of performance
to a stranger and not to prevent the assignment of a right to
money damages.
Respectfully submitted,
GORDON I. HYDE,
Attorney for Appellant
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